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In this article, we briefly outline and explain Roderick Chisholm's 
theory of agent causation, critically evaluate certain criticisms of it 
advanced by Harry Frankfurt, Clifford Williams and Irving Thalberg, and 
show that the theory can be improved by elaborating it in two ways, one of 
which is suggested by the work of Richard Taylor. 
Chisholm frames what he labels "the metaphysical problem of human 
freedom" as follows: 
Human beings are responsible agents; but this fact appears to conflict 
with a deterministic view of human action (the view that every event 
that is involved in an act is caused by some other event); and it also 
appears to conflict with an indeterministic view of human action (the 
view that the act, or some event that is essential to the act, is not 
caused at all). To solve this problem, I believe, we must make 
somewhat far-reaching assumptions about the self of the agent—about 
the man who performs the act. 
The statement, explication and development of these assumptions is 
Chisholm's theory of agent causation. 
Thus, Chisholm advances his theory because he believes that it can 
account for the fact that human beings are responsible agents whereas 
neither a deterministic nor a strictly indeterministic view of human action 
can do so. 2 We will not attempt to determine whether it is a fact that 
human beings are responsible agents, nor whether the existence of agent 
causation is a necessary condition of such responsible agency, but will confine 
ourselves to the more modest agenda outlined above. 
Chisholm explicates the proposition that persons are agents who 
sometimes possess the freedom to act otherwise than they actually do act 
(according to Chisholm, the most fundamental assumption about the agent 
Roderick Chisholm, "Freedom and Action," in Keith Lehrer, ed., Freedom 
and Determinism (New York: Random House, 1966), p. II . 
2 By a "deterministic view of human action" we mean that view which 
states that every human action is produced by a sufficient causal condition. 
By a "strictly indeterministic view of human action" we mean that view 
which holds that free actions are wholly uncaused, i.e., neither produced 
by a sufficient causal condition nor freely initiated by an agent. 
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"Terms such as "his" and "he" should be taken where appropriate as 
abbreviations for "his or hers" and "he or she" respectively. 
4The key concept of "causal contribution" and the role of reasons, purposes 
and motivations in causally contributing to the occurrence of free actions will 
be explained more fully when we discuss the criticism leveled at agency 
theory by Williams and Thalberg. 
5Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in 
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXVIII, No. 1, January 14, 1971, pp. 5-20. 
<To the best of my knowledge, Chisholm has not given an argument for his 
assumption that our ordinary activities presuppose that human beings are 
morally responsible in a sense which requires that they agent-cause at least 
some of their actions. However, given the truth of this assumption, this 
line of argument is effective in rebutting Frankfurt's objection. 
which is required to resolve successfully "the metaphysical problem of 
human freedom") in the following way. There are instances of free action in 
which there is neither a sufficient causal condition for "undertaking p" 
("acting with the intention of bringing about p") nor a sufficient causal 
condition for not "undertaking p": i.e., it is neither causally necessary that 
the person perform the given action or causally necessary that the person 
not perform the given action. The agent is the causal source of his free 
actions. 3 The agent freely performs these actions: i.e., he causally 
contributes to his performing them and is not caused to do so by antecedently 
existing conditions.4 
We will now turn our attention to some criticisms of Chisholm's theory. 
In his "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,"5 Harry Frankfurt 
contends that an adequate theory of human freedom must be able both to 
account for our disinclination to ascribe such freedom to animals and to 
explain why having this freedom is desirable. He then argues that 
Chisholm's theory meets neither of these requirements and thus is 
inadequate. 
Frankfurt's first criticism is off the mark. While it is true that 
Chisholm does not explain why it makes sense not to attribute agency to 
members of other animal species, clearly he could have used his approach 
to argue as follows. It makes sense to hold that persons are free agents 
because the weak inductive argument to the contrary (i.e., the argument 
from the fact that some human actions are wholly explainable in terms of 
event causation to the conclusion that all are wholly explainable in such 
terms) is outweighed by the conjunction of the fact that it is a fundamental 
presupposition of our ordinary activities that persons are morally 
responsible for at least some of their actions and the fact that such moral 
responsibility presupposes that persons are free agents.6 On the other hand, 
it makes sense not to attribute such agency to other animals, since the much 
stronger inductive argument for the total causal determination of their 
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behavior is not counterbalanced in any way: i.e., we do not presuppose that 
animals are responsible agents nor are there any other rationally justified 
considerations which render plausible the proposition that animals are 
free agents. 
Frankfurt's second criticism is also unfounded. As we have seen, he 
claims that Chisholm's theory does not explain why possession of the 
capacity to agent-cause at least some of one's actions is desirable. This 
criticism is doubly flawed. First of all, it isn't clear that the adequacy of 
Chisholm's theory rests in any measure upon its capacity to explain the 
desirability of possessing such causal power. After all, Chisholm is simply 
making the claim that we have such power. Since the proposition that 
persons are agents bears no logical relationship to the proposition that 
possession of such causal power is desirable, Chisholm's theory (an 
explication and elaboration of the former proposition) is not deficient 
merely if it does not substantiate the latter proposition. 
In addition, it is clear that Chisholm's theory can explain why having 
such causal power is desirable. While Frankfurt is quite right in saying 
that there is no discernible phenomenological difference between the 
experience of a person who agent-causes a given action and that of a person 
who performs the same action without there being any breach of the event-
causal nexus, surely Frankfort is incorrect in assuming that this provides 
good reason to believe that there is no basis for preferring to be a 
Chisholmian agent as opposed to a deterministically conceived actor.7 
To see that this is the case, we shall use Frankfurt's distinction between 
"first-order desires" and "second-order desires." Frankfurt defines first-
order desires as "desires to do or not to do one thing or another."8 He defines 
a second-order desire as either a desire "to have a certain desire" or a desire 
that a certain desire be effective in moving oneself to action.9 It will be 
useful for our purposes to broaden the notion of "second-order desire" to 
include all the desires regarding the role which desires play in the 
production of one's own actions. 
Given that one believes, as Chisholm and others do, that the existence 
of agent causation is a necessary condition of responsible agency, the 
preferability of being a Chisholmian agent to being either a 
deterministically conceived actor or a person whose only free actions are 
wholly uncaused can be understood in terms of the second-order desire to 
have one's desires (and the various other causally contributing factors) play 
that role in the bringing about of one's actions which allows for the 
possibility of one's possessing that human dignity which comes from being a 
responsible agent and that justified sense of pride at having been truly 
7Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in 
The journal of Philosophy, Vol, LXVIII, No. 1, January 14, 1971, p. 18. 
8lbid., p. 7. 
9Ibid., p. 10. 
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responsible for acting rightly and living well. Clearly if one desired to 
have such human dignity and to justifiably take pride in at least some of 
one's actions and one believed that one's being a Chisholmian agent is a 
necessary condition for each of these things, one would have a basis for 
preferring to be such an agent to being a deterministically conceived actor or 
a person whose only free actions are wholly uncaused. 
The subject of uncaused, random actions brings us to a very recent 
criticism of agency theory. In his "Indeterminism and the Theory of 
Agency," Clifford Williams argues that the theory of agent causation 
cannot account for the possibility of moral responsibility since it does not 
remove the capriciousness that is said to characterize wholly uncaused 
actions.1 0 The success of his arguments hinges upon one central contention, 
namely that the concept of "self-movement" cannot be used to explain the 
occurrence of agent-caused actions at all. 
Williams says that because, as stated by the theory of agency, there is 
no sufficient causal condition for the occurrence of the free action, the 
occurrence of such actions is capricious. He states that the agency theorist's 
attempt to explain the occurrence of the free action through recourse to the 
agent's bringing about the free action does not remove this capriciousness 
since it is the case that the agent's bringing it about either is produced by a 
sufficient causal condition or is not. If it is produced by a sufficient causal 
condition, then the agency theorist's conception of free action has been 
undercut. If it is not produced by a sufficient causal condition, then it is 
capricious and unexplainable. 
Williams dismisses an apparently promising retort which an agency 
theorist can make, namely that the agent is causally responsible for the 
"bringing about of the action" as well as for the action. He says that this 
strategy will not work because one could ask if the agent is responsible for 
the "bringing about of the bringing about of the action" and so on, ad 
infinitum. Thus, Williams's point is that if the agency theorist persists in 
his claim that the occurrence of the free action is ultimately attributable to 
the causal power of the agent, the agency theorist commits himself to the 
existence of an infinite regress of alleged agent-causings which is causally 
ungrounded since no item in the series is "grounded" upon anything other 
than a capricious and unexplainable "bringing about of a bringing about of a 
bringing about..." 
We will show that Williams's contention is incorrect. As we have seen, 
Chisholm's view is that there are cases in which it is neither causally 
necessary that the person perform the action which is actually performed 
nor causally necessary that the person not perform it. In such a case, the 
agent is the causal source of the action. The agent freely performs the 
1 0Clifford Williams, indeterminism and the Theory of Agency," in 
Philosophy and Phenomcnological Research, Vol, XLV, No. 1, September, 
1984, pp. 111-119. 
AGENCY THEORY RECONSIDERED 73 
action: he causally contributes to his performing the action and is not caused 
to do so by antecedently existing conditions. 
Thus, the action is not an uncaused, random or capricious occurrence. 
Rather, it is caused or brought about by the agent. To then ask, "But how is 
this bringing about of the action caused?", is to treat the agent's bringing 
about of the action as an event separate and distinct from the agent's action 
rather than as the very activity of the agent itself. (One could say that the 
agent's acting constitutes the bringing about of his action.) Moreover, in 
asking this question, Williams clearly begs the question, for he presupposes 
that the agent's bringing about of the action is an event whose occurrence 
has not been causally explained simply because there is no prior event 
which is said to have produced it (and thereby does not acknowledge the 
possibility that it was agent-caused), while this bringing about of the 
action is the very activity which, according to agency theory, has been 
caused by the agent. 
Therefore, agency theory does not have to posit an infinite regress of 
alleged agent-causings in its attempt to explain the occurrence of agent-
caused actions. This is required only on the question-begging assumption 
that the only type of causal explanation of an event is the specifying of an 
antecedent event which produced it. Hence, a theory of agency is capable of 
transcending the capriciousness that is said to characterize wholly 
uncaused actions if it can explain how the agent's bringing about of the given 
free action is not capricious, because, as we have seen, this "bringing about of 
the action" is the only exercise of agency that the agency theorist must 
posit. As we shall establish, this challenge can be met. 
In outlining his theory of agent causation, Chisholm speaks of reasons, 
motivations and many other factors as causally contributing to an agent's 
free actions. (There are, he says, many actions which we cannot perform 
unless we have a purpose or motive for doing so. 1 1 If the agent performs such 
an action, the purpose or motive causally contributes to the agent's 
performing the given action by being a necessary condition of that 
performance.) Thus, Chisholm does not opt for a strict indeterminism in 
which the concept of event causation is held to be totally useless in 
explaining the occurrence of free actions. He simply maintains that there 
are instances in which such causally contributing factors do not constitute 
and are not part of a sufficient causal condition for the occurrence of the 
given action.1 2 In such cases, the agent freely initiates his action. 
Thus, there are two ways in which the theory of agent causation 
transcends the capriciousness that characterizes wholly uncaused actions. 
First, the theory states that reasons and motivations causally contribute to 
an agent's free actions: i.e., the agent is motivated to act in certain ways 
^Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1976), p. 57. 
nlbid., p. 68-9. 
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, 3 Irving Thalberg, "Agent Causation and Reasons for Acting," in 
Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, VII (1978), p. 564. 
, 4Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1966), pp. 155-156. 
and acts with the intention of bringing about certain states of affairs which 
he believes will fulfill certain of his purposes. Such motivated and 
purposive free action is manifestly different from action which is wholly 
uncaused and thereby capricious and wholly unexplainable. Secondly, the 
theory of agent causation asserts that there exist agents who sometimes 
freely act in such a purposive manner, i.e., who initiate certain of their 
actions without being caused to do so. Clearly, this notion of free action 
differs radically from the concept of free action as wholly uncaused action. 
The latter type of free "action" is not, properly speaking, performed by 
anyone, but merely happens to the person whose "actions" they are. 
This discussion of freely initiated purposive activity brings us to 
another criticism of agency theory. In his "Agent Causation and Reasons for 
Acting," Irving Thalberg raises the following objection: 
I am baffled because we have a "responsible act" such that "the agent's 
undertaking" it has no "sufficient causal condition." Yet he has 
"reasons for acting as he did," which may include a desire and some 
"ought" thinking. Aren't these a sufficient condition or part of one? . . . 
But if we act for reasons, how can these constitute anything other than 
a sufficient causal condition, or part of one, for the movement of our 
body which fulfills our action plan? 1 3 
In order to demonstrate that an agency theorist can consistently speak 
of an agent's having reasons for his free actions, it will be helpful to 
examine Richard Taylor's distinction between two fundamentally different 
theories of the nature of thought: 
The first theory . . . envisions thought to be a series or stream of things 
"within" one. My thinking, then consists of my having various things, 
such as ideas, impressions, images, feelings and other subjective or 
"private" things . . . My thoughts are, in any case, not literally created 
by me. In thinking, 1 do not make my own thoughts, I do not originate 
them . . . 
The other theory is to the effect that thinking is sometimes an 
activity, that my thoughts are not in the ordinary sense things that 
merely arise and subside in my mind, but that they are sometimes acts 
that I literally perform.14 
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If a person's thinking is not simply a stream of mental entities which 
he is unable freely to direct, but rather is sometimes a realm of freely 
initiated activity, he can be causally affected by his previous mental 
states, e.g., his having reasons, purposes and motives at certain stages in a 
deliberate process, without these states being part of a sufficient causal 
condition for the occurrence of a given action. For if thinking is sometimes 
freely initiated, an agent could sometimes freely direct his deliberations by 
choosing some purposes, reasons and motives as being more worthy than 
others of guiding his deliberations and his action in a way which is not 
caused by his previous mental states. 
Hence, in such cases, the person's having certain reasons, purposes and 
motives at the outset of his deliberations and at certain other stages in the 
deliberative process is not part of a sufficient causal condition for his acting 
as he eventually does. Yet, the having of those reasons, purposes and 
motives for the sake of which the agent freely decided to act causally 
contributed to his free action since they were integral parts of the 
deliberative process which culminated in his decision to act as he did. The 
existence of such factors causally contributed to the occurrence of the action 
in the sense of making its occurrence more likely than it would otherwise 
have been. (In some of these cases, this "making more likely" takes the 
form of being a necessary condition of the action, i.e, a condition without 
which the action would not only be less likely but would be impossible.) 
Thus, elaborating Chisholm's theory of agent causation to include the 
proposition that an agent can freely initiate at least some of his thinking 
allows his theory to render intelligible agent-caused actions which are 
done for reasons. (We do not mean to suggest that Chisholm's theory 
unsupplemented by Taylor's thesis regarding agent-caused thinking is 
incapable of making clear how agent-caused actions that are done for 
reasons are possible, but simply that Chisholm's theory supplemented by 
Taylor's thesis is clearly able to do so.) 
Having explained the nature of Chisholm's theory of agent causation 
and shown that agency theory can rebut successfully the aforementioned 
criticisms, we will conclude by suggesting two improvements of Chisholm's 
theory. The incorporation of Taylor's thesis that an agent can freely 
initiate at least some of his thinking would improve Chisholm's theory, 
because such an elaboration is a necessary condition of an agency theory's 
satisfactorily accounting for the invariable synchronization between an 
agent's free actions and his thoughts.15 
In order to see that Chisholm's theory unsupplemented by Taylor's 
thesis does not make sense of the aforementioned synchronization, we shall 
imagine a person who is deliberating about whether to perform action A or 
perform action B. If he cannot agent-cause any of his thoughts, each and 
, s To the best of my knowledge, Chisholm does not subscribe to the view that 
there are agent-caused thoughts. 
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1 6 I t is true that there occasionally occur thoughts which are not 
synchronized with the actions they accompany, i.e., thoughts which 
presuppose propositions which are incompatible with certain truths about 
the nature of the action itself. For example, one is intending to make a 
lesser amount of a casserole by halving the quantities of the various 
ingredients. One thinks one is doing this, while one is actually doubling 
certain of the ingredients. Such gaps between thought and action may be 
severe and frequent or mild and infrequent. In the later case, they could be 
the result of simple inattentiveness. In the former case, they probably 
reflect severe psychological problems. 
Nevertheless, it is the case both that in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, synchronization between thoughts and actions exists and that any 
plausible theory of agent causation would have to hold that many agent-
caused actions are not out of sync in the aforementioned manner, i.e., that 
many agent-caused actions are not accompanied by thoughts which 
presuppose propositions which are incompatible with certain truths about 
the nature of the action itself. If a theory of agent causation did not hold 
this to be true, it would be condemned to a counter-intuitive absurdity-free 
actions either always or usually occur when the person believes that he is 
doing something else, i.e., when he docs not know what he is doing. 
every step of his deliberative process (including of course the final step, the 
decision itself) would be produced by a sufficient causal condition. The 
question arises, "Will this person act in accordance with the decision 
arrived at through deliberation?" According to Chisholm, the subsequent 
action is freely initiated, even though none of the agent's thoughts are 
freely initiated. 
When a person acts for a reason, i.e., acts with the intention of 
implementing a decision made through his deliberating, he often acts with 
various types of thoughts in mind. He may be deciding to implement his 
deliberative decision as he is in the very act of doing so. He may be 
thinking that he has made the right choice by so acting. He may be 
anticipating certain favorable outcomes from his so acting. He may be 
acting with various of the reasons for so acting before his mind. In short, the 
person often will be thinking in various ways which make sense given the 
way he is acting. 
However, this congruence between thinking and acting is inexplicable if 
it is the case both that these actions are agent-caused and that these 
thoughts are not agent-caused. If each thought is produced by a sufficient 
causal condition, but some actions are not (and thus could have been 
otherwise), why does it almost always happen that those thoughts which 
accompany a person's actions jibe so well with those actions?1 6 Because the 
thoughts could not have been otherwise, they are on a "causal track" which 
has no gaps, no points at which there exists causal insufficiency. However, 
some of these actions are freely initiated and thus could have been 
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otherwise than they were. Hence, these actions could have been out of 
synchronization with the thoughts which accompany them. Why is it that 
they very rarely are? 
It would be ridiculously implausible to hold that this synchronization 
is merely coincidental. However, if it is not mere coincidence, what 
explanation could be provided except that these thoughts and those that 
precede them are, in the vast majority of cases, the dominant components of 
a sufficient causal condition of the action that is performed? It is not open to 
an agency theorist to explain this synchronization by saying that the person 
is not caused to act as he does by his thoughts, but rather acts on the basis of 
reasons. For the question is, "What accounts for the perfect synchronization 
(in the vast majority of cases) between thoughts which are caused by 
sufficient causal conditions and actions which are freely initiated and 
hence not produced by sufficient causal conditions?" Appealing to the 
proposition that the agent freely acts on the basis of reasons does not account 
for this synchronization because the agent's decision to act in X-manner on 
the basis of reasons A through C is merely one thought-event in the nexus of 
thinkings, each of which is produced by a sufficient causal condition. The 
question remains, "Why does a deterministic nexus of thinkings match up so 
well with the agent's freely initiated actions?" To put this question 
negatively, "Why is there not more than an extremely occasional lack of 
synchronization between such thoughts and actions?" 
By not providing for the existence of agent-caused thoughts within the 
context of his theory of agent causation, Chisholm renders himself unable to 
explain the intimate relationship between thinking and acting in cases of 
freely initiated action. As a matter of common sense, we believe that the 
aforementioned synchronization is attributable to the fact that humans act 
rationally in the minimal sense of acting for reasons (as opposed to the 
maximal sense of acting for sufficiently good reasons). However, as we have 
seen, this cannot provide us with an adequate explanation of the 
aforementioned synchronization if it is the case both that the actions in 
question are freely initiated and that none of the thoughts in question are 
freely initiated. Thus, within the context of a theory of agent causation, if 
we are to be able plausibly to explain this synchronization between 
thoughts and free actions, we must assume that at least some human 
thoughts are freely initiated. As we shall see, this assumption will allow 
us to create such a plausible explanation. 
As we have seen earlier in this article, if persons can agent-cause at 
least some of their thoughts, they can freely direct the course of their 
deliberations. By doing so, they freely initiate at least some of their 
actions: i.e., some human actions are such that for each of them it is the 
case both that at the time immediately preceding the agent-caused 
thoughts there is not a sufficient causal condition for the person to perform 
the given action nor is there a sufficient causal condition for the person not 
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I 7Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (London. George Allen and Unwin, 
1976), p. 69. 
,8/bid., p. 69. 
perform the given action, and that the person causally contributes to his 
performing the given action. 
Our explanation suggests itself. If agents freely initiate at least some 
of their thoughts, it is quite understandable that in cases of freely initiated 
actions the agent's thoughts and actions are well synchronized both because 
much of the causal contribution that the agent makes to his freely initiated 
action is that causal contribution he makes to his freely initiated thinking 
and because it is after all the same agent who is directing both the stream of 
his thoughts and the course of his actions. Of course, neither of these things 
would be the case if there were no agent-caused thoughts. Thus, in order 
adequately to account for this synchronization between thought and action 
which any plausible theory of agent causation must assert to exist in cases of 
agent-caused action, Chisholm's theory must be elaborated to include the 
proposition that persons agent-cause at least some of their thoughts. 
There is another point on which Chisholm's theory as presently 
formulated is not fully adequate, namely his discussion of the ways in 
which reasons and motives can causally contribute to the occurrence of 
agent-caused actions. 
Chisholm correctly notes that reasons and motives can serve as 
necessary conditions of agent-caused actions. He uses the killing of our 
friends or our family as examples of actions which are so abhorrent to us 
that we cannot undertake them without having some reason or motive for 
doing so. (As we have noted, for Chisholm "to undertake p" is "to act with 
the intention of bringing about p.") 
Chisholm also rightly points out that reasons or motives can incline us 
to perform a given action without necessitating us to do so. He uses the 
example of a public official whose "scruples are sufficiently strong that he 
would never undertake to bring it about that he is offered a bribe," but "his 
desire for money is sufficiently strong that, if he were offered a bribe, he 
would be unable to refuse it." Chisholm defines "a motive's inclining but 
not necessitating a person's undertaking" in the following way: 
he desires p; it is not within his power to undertake not-p; but it is 
within his power not to undertake p. 1 8 
Chisholm's account of these matters is satisfactory as far as it goes. 
However, it is not an adequate exploration of that category of states of 
affairs which may properly be described as, "a motive's inclining but not 
necessitating a given undertaking," if this is taken to mean, "a motive's 
making it more likely, but not necessitating, that a given undertaking 
occur." 
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If the theory of agent causation is true, surely there are cases in which 
a motive inclines but does not necessitate a given undertaking (in the sense of 
making that undertaking more likely while not necessitating that it occur) 
that do not fit Chisholm's aforementioned definition of "inclination 
without necessitation." Imagine the following situation. Joe is sitting in a 
park studying for an upcoming exam. Joe enjoys playing softball and has 
some desire to play softball at the present time. Imagine also that there 
are many softball games taking place in the park at present. It is within 
Joe's power not to undertake to bring it about that he is invited to play in a 
softball game. It is also the case that joe would be able to resist an 
invitation to play softball if he were to receive one. 
All of this is both internally consistent and conceivable. We would be 
correct in saying that Joe's desire to play softball "inclined but did not 
necessitate" him to play because it made him more likely to play than he 
would have been if he did not have this motive, but did not make it 
causally necessary that he play. 1 9 However, this example would not 
qualify as "inclination without necessitation" as Chisholm defines it 
because joe had the power to resist acting on the inclining desire even when 
invited to do so. Thus, Chisholm's definition of "inclination without 
necessitation" is too narrow to include all of those cases in which motives 
incline but do not necessitate us to perform a given action. Therefore, his 
account does not outline all of the ways in which motives or reasons may 
"Hi 
causally contribute to an agent's free actions. 
1 9What we mean by, "made him more likely to play," is simply, "added 
additional causal power to his motivation to play." This does not imply 
that upon this occasion or any other occasion the agent in question will be 
unable to successfully resist such a motivation. 
2 0 1 would like to thank Peter Hare for his constructive criticism and his 
many helpful suggestions. 
